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Still No Redundant Properties: Reply to Wielenberg
C B
Dra of 16th October, 2012
In previous work (Brown, 2011), I proposed an argument for Ethical Naturalism, the view that there
are no non-natural ethical properties.1 A premise in my argument was the principle that no prop-
erties are redundant. (Below I call this principle “NRP”, short for “No Redundant Properties”.) A
property is redundant, in the relevant sense, if it does not enhance our ability to distinguish possibil-
ities: any possibilities that are distinguishable with this property are equally distinguishable without
it. I showed that if ethical properties supervene on natural properties, then any non-natural ethical
properties are in this way redundant. NRP implies, therefore, that ethical properties cannot super-
vene on natural properties unless they are natural properties. Erik J. Wielenberg has criticised my
argument, and NRP in particular (Wielenberg, 2011). Below I respond.
Wielenberg begins by arguing directly against NRP. Here is his argument:
Consider the following line of reasoning. Suppose that the God of traditionalmonothe-
ism exists. is God exists in every possible world and is essentially omniscient (for any
proposition p, if p is true, then p is known [and hence believed] by God) and essentially
infallible (for any proposition p, if God believes that p, then p is true), which implies
that necessarily, for any proposition p, p is true if and only if God believes p. us,
for every pair of possible worlds w1 and w2 that are indistinguishable with respect to
at least all properties except being believed by God, it is also the case that w1 and w2
are indistinguishable with respect to all properties. Consequently, the property of be-
ing believed by God is redundant in Brown’s sense. By similar reasoning, the property
of being true is also redundant. If there are no redundant properties, then at least one
of these properties (being true or being believed by God) does not exist. us, [NRP]
implies that the existence of the God of traditional monotheism is incompatible with
there being some truths, from which it surely follows that this God does not exist. is
argument seems too fast. (Wielenberg, 2011, 2–3)
By “this argument”, in the last sentence, I assumeWielenberg means this argument: there are no
redundant properties; therefore, there is no God. I am unsure, however, what he means by saying
that it is “too fast”. Normally, I would have thought, to call an argument “too fast” is just to say, in a
colourful way, that it is invalid. e conclusion has been drawn prematurely; the premises are not
yet strong enough to rule out all possibilities in which the conclusion is false. e argument thus
moves too hastily from premises to conclusion.
Were thisWielenberg’s meaning, I would happily agree. As I show below, the argument is indeed
invalid. However, I do not think this can be what he means. First, he seems to think the argument
1Strictly, my argument concerned “descriptive” properties. Here I switch to “natural” because this seems the more
common terminology.
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is valid: he says that the premise implies the conclusion.2 More importantly, the argument’s being
invalid would not in any way impugn the premise. Everyone knows that invalid arguments may
have true premises. Yet it is the premise that is in dispute.3
What Wielenberg wants to say, I think, is this. Atheism — the view that there is no God — is
controversial. And, since NRP entails atheism, it is no less controversial. e point is to highlight
how strong a premise NRP is, by revealing one of its contentious consequences.
is objection is intelligible. If NRP did indeed imply atheism, then that would, I grant, be a
mark against my argument, though not necessarily a decisive one. However, NRP does not imply
atheism. To show this, it will be helpful to set out Wielenberg’s argument more precisely. So far as I
can tell, it goes like this:
P1. If God exists, then the predicate “true” is necessarily coextensive with another
predicate, “believed by God”.
P2. If “true” is necessarily coextensive with another predicate, then any property
denoted by “true” is redundant.
P3. If “true” does not denote a property, then nothing is true.
P4. Something is true.
C. If God exists, there is at least one redundant property.
is is valid. Premises (P3) and (P4) together imply that “true” denotes a property, and (P1) and
(P2) imply that this property is redundant if God exists. However, (P2) and (P3) are dubious.
Begin with (P2). As I explained inmy earlier paper, what is true is this: if two predicates are nec-
essarily coextensive, and they each denote distinct properties, then these properties are redundant
(Brown, 2011, 215-6). Wielenberg has overlooked two possibilities. One is that “true” and “believed
by God” denote the same property.4 e other is that only “true” denotes a property; “believed by
God” does not. Wielenberg is thinking that if the property of being true were removed, our ability
to distinguish possibilities would not be diminished, because we would still have the property of
being believed by God, and anything distinguishable by the former property would be equally dis-
tinguishable by the latter. But this is not so if either (a) there is no such property as being believed
by God, or (b) there is such a property but it is identical to being true.
e other questionable premise, (P3), seems to assume a general principle that I explicitly re-
jected in my paper, namely, that “there can be things which satisfy a given predicate only if there’s a
corresponding property which those things instantiate” (Brown, 2011, 214). As a counterexample
to this principle, I gave the predicate “non-self-instantiating”.5 Moreover, the view that truth is not a
property is already held by some philosophers who endorse a “deĘationary” theory of truth.6 ese
philosophers do not deny that there are truths.
2He says that NRP “implies that the existence of the God of traditional monotheism is incompatible with there being
some truths, from which it surely follows that this God does not exist” (Wielenberg, 2011, 3). I assume that if P surely
follows from Q, then Q implies P (and, of course, that implication is transitive).
3Wielenberg gives another argument in a similar vein. He points out that NRP is incompatible with views in the
philosophy of mind according to which there are “phenomenal properties” which supervene on but are distinct from
physical properties; he offers Colin McGuinn’s “newmysterianism” as an example (Wielenberg, 2011, 3). Again he alleges
that this somehow implicates NRP in reasoning that is “too fast”. I ĕnd this allegation equally obscure.
4at Wielenberg overlooked this possibility is a little surprising. e question whether distinct properties can be
necessarily coextensive has received much attention in the relevant literature. See, e.g., Jackson (1998, 125-8), Shafer-
Landau (2003, 90-2), Streumer (2008, 541-5), and Brown (2011, 215-6).
5Here’s another counterexample. Many philosophers — including, perhaps, Kant — deny that existence is a property:
there is no such property as the property of existing. But they do not thereby believe that nothing exists.
6See, e.g., Ayer (1936, 87)
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I do not insist that NRP is entirely innocuous. Any premise strong enough to imply Ethical
Naturalism is bound to be contentious. But it is important to be clear on just how strong NRP is,
and Wielenberg has signiĕcantly overstated its strength.
Wielenberg also challenges the rationale I gave for NRP. is rationale appeals to ontological
parsimony. Redundant properties, I argued, are unnecessary; we do not need to posit them. And
therefore we should not posit them.
Wielenberg’s criticism, however, seems to misunderstand my argument. He says:
Brown’s rationale for [NRP] is adequate only if the only good reason to believe that a
particular property is instantiated is that the instantiation of that property would serve
to distinguish possibilities. (Wielenberg, 2011, 3)
But this, I think, is false. I need not deny that theremay be reasons to believe in redundant properties.
I do say that we should not believe in such properties, but that is a different claim. If I told you, for
example, that you should not eat poisonous food, I would not thereby imply that the only reason
you can have to eat food is that it is non-poisonous. Wielenberg suggests that one reason we have
for believing in non-natural ethical properties, despite their redundancy, is that it sometimes seems
to us intuitively that certain events instantiate such properties (Wielenberg, 2011, 4). I am quite
willing to grant that this is such a reason. Still, I maintain, we should not believe in such properties;
the reason is outweighed.
I do claim that we have no need to posit redundant properties. Wielenberg’s example might be
intended as a counterexample to this claim. According to him, perhaps, we need to posit non-natural
ethical properties in order to explain why it appears to us that certain events have such properties.
But this seems simply false; surely we can explain these appearances in other ways, without commit-
ting to the existence of such properties.7 Similarly, we do not need to posit ghosts in order to explain
why some people feel that they can sense the presence of dead relatives. In order to undermine my
case for NRP, Wielenberg needs to show, not merely that we may have reasons to posit redundant
properties, but that we need to do so. I do not think he has done this.
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